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I. Introduction
When Alexis de Tocqueville analyzed democracy and its new political 
culture in America about a hundred and sixty years ago, he uttered the well-
known statement: “A new political science is needed for a world itself quite 
new.” (1) It seems to me that Arendt’s political theory of freedom and citizenship 
is capable of contributing to envisioning a novel theory of politics now 
postulated for a new world of the twenty-first century. The world of today is 
characterized by uncertainties surrounding the sovereign state paradigm of 
modernity that set forth the dominating pattern for the arrangement of political 
society over the past three centuries. It is true, however, that the sovereign 
state system of modernity still remains effective in the international politics of 
the early twenty-first century. Furthermore, it is difficult to locate a new and 
emerging paradigm of political society that will replace it. But we are witnessing 
“anomalies” in the sense used by Thomas Kuhn that the paradigm of the 
sovereign state can no longer explain. 
Naturally, these “anomalies” are either engendered or highlighted by such 
socio-political realities of the early twenty-first century as the globalization of 
financial capitalism, the north-south dichotomy in the relations of international 
economy, the rapid spread of global terrorism, and the counter attacks and new 
types of retaliatory war policies initiated by the United States of America in the 
face of the post-September 11 crisis. The list may also include the ecological 
and natural resources crises which threaten the earth as the habitat for humanity 
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and other creatures, and the explosive advancement of the mechanism of 
transportation, communication and information, brought by technological 
discoveries and advancements. These “anomalies” seem to be in part at least 
related to the essential significance of the territoriality of the sovereign state 
which categorically divides the inside from the outside.(2) This categorical 
division between the inside and the outside of the territorial boundary of 
the sovereign state is too overarching and rigid to cope with a number of 
nonterritorial issues, which are becoming more and more pressing in the early 
twenty-first century reality of the world. The present world is on a constant 
move toward the new epoch when no longer the state sovereignty alone but the 
citizens of the world will begin to assume the primary category of the political. 
To be sure, Arendt’s lack of institutional concerns, often criticized by a 
number of commentators, can be regarded as a weakness of her political theory. 
Except for some ideas regarding a vision of a worldwide federal system, the 
imaginative fertility of her political theorizing does not seem to yield much 
needed theories concerning those institutional frameworks and democratic rights 
and obligations in light of which citizens can pursue the implementation of the 
politics of freedom and citizenship. This is a fundamental problem in Arendt’s 
political theory. 
But, as indicated above, Arendt showed some hints about the more 
appropriate and feasible alternative of the institutional design vis-à-vis the 
current nation state system. One of these possibilities is her occasional reference 
to the possibility of a worldwide federal system which she sporadically made 
from time to time. And as recent discussions on “new constitutionalism” (3) 
proffered by Karol Edward Soltan, Stephen J. Elkin, and others seem to suggest, 
current political theorizing has become interested in the capacity of traditional 
concepts for providing the new political design for political society. The 
proposal for “new constitutionalism” is meant to express the theoretical effort to 
understand more broadly its meaning in order to cover not only the traditional 
significance of constitutionalism as the legal apparatus of check and balance to 
control the political power of rulership. It aims further at broadening the concept 
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so as to signify the function of constitutionalism to constitute the insitutional 
design for political society. Yet one of our purposes in this article is by no means 
to explore the conceptural possibility of “constitutionalism” but rather to claim 
that the traditional concept of federalism should be highlighted as to its capacity 
for institutional design in view of the fact that federalism has long served as 
the prominent mechanism of institutional design for political society for many 
centuries. 
The strength of Arendt’s political theory, however, resides in its capacity to 
invite ordinary people and citizens to cultivate what can be termed as  spirituality 
of citizenship. The essence of her theory of citizenship does not reside in the 
category of liberal right with its emphasis on the formal and legal aspects of 
citizenship. But, like Sheldon S. Wolin’s or Bernard Crick’s, it primarily belongs 
to its substantial category of constitution, participation, and solidarity which 
ultimately stems back to Aristotle.(4) In this sense, Arendt’s theory of citizenship 
stands in sharp contrast to the formal and legal category of citizenship whose 
unique feature consists in the guarantee of the rights of the members of the 
nation (the subjects) and their incorporation into the state. This participatory 
category of citizenship does not remain within its formal and legal category of 
representation, corporation, right, and entitlement of which Jean Bodin--one 
might add Hobbes and Locke--was apparently an arch-theorist. The latter is 
constituted on the premise of ruling power of the sovereign state, i.e., its absolute 
control over the state boundaries. One can rightly say that the contemporary 
liberal theory of rights essentially resides in the Bodinist heritage.(5) 
Citizens who, Arendt presupposes, can be regarded as a sort of 
contemporary “political animals”(Aristotle). In her understanding citizens do 
not perceive themselves as the privatized inhabitants of the city, preoccupied 
with defending their own rights vis-à-vis others and the city. Moreover, they 
regard themselves as the political actors and initiators who make the city a 
genuine world of their own by loving, and caring for, it. Therefore, for Arendt 
citizens are not simply the indwellers of the city but the common builders of it. 
They are not naturally citizens by birth; rather they become citizens by loving 
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the city and committing themselves to its common welfare.(6) This participatory 
conception of citizenship in Arendt is a fundamental “anomaly” with the modern 
conception of citizenship and nationality which is basically Bodinist, formal, 
and representational. At the same time, Arendt’s participatory conception of 
citizenship inserts a radical doubt into this modern conception of citizenship 
where a cultural community is simply superimposed. What unmistakably 
lies at the center of Arendt’s conception of citizenship is the spirit of amor 
mundi as the public bond which produces a citizens’ politics of solidarity and 
friendship. This politics of solidarity and friendship, which manifests itself in 
voluntary associations, aims at the constitution of the common world. It resists, 
if necessary, those world-alienating forces which would threaten their world-
building capacity.   
II. Arendt’s Two Notions of Action
Perhaps the best summary of Hannah Arendt’s political theory is her well-
known statement: “The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of 
experience is action.” (7) Herein is expressed Arendt’s vision of a politics of 
freedom in which politics, freedom, and action are integrated with one another 
in a tight trinitarian formula. In this vision, there lies at the core of politics the 
notion of public freedom as citizens’ collective action through speech and deed 
in the public realm. Politics, freedom, and action are so intimately fused with 
one another that whatever does not belong to this trinity--whether it is the social, 
truth, conscience, or goodness--is jealously warded off from the public realm, 
the only place for her where authentic politics takes place.
It is often--and correctly--noted that Arendt holds two different notions of 
action, both of which can be traced back to Greek antiquity and seem, at first 
glance, contradictory to each other. One notion is concerned with Aristotelian 
concerted action, the other with Homeric agonistic performance. Her magnum 
opus, The Human Condition (1958), is indeed an intriguing work where these 
two divergent notions of action are simply laid down side by side(8) without any 
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deliberate attempt on her part to account for the relationship of the two. Those 
two notions of action in turn compose the basic, inescapable ingredients in her 
dual conception of politics: a politics of world-constructing and a politics of 
resistance.
To begin with, insofar as a recent growing literature on Arendt claims to 
show, the current interest in the public sphere and deliberative democracy once 
again has drawn the attention of political theorists to her first notion of action, 
i.e., citizens’ cooperation or concerted action in speech and deed. They have 
rediscovered a political theorist of the public sphere par excellence in Arendt 
who, together with Jürgen Habermas and Sheldon S. Wolin in their respective 
manners, laid down creative ways of criticizing both the solidification of state 
power and the citizens’ privatization in late modernity. They singled out the 
public sphere or the political as the citadel of genuine politics and democracy.(9) 
Insofar as Arendt is concerned, it is evident that the notion of citizens’ 
cooperation in terms of “acting in concert” (Edmund Burke) rests on her 
theoretical reconstruction of the ancient Greek experiences of the bios politikos 
as epitomized by Aristotle.(10) According to her innovative understanding, since 
action like speech is based on the fundamental human condition of plurality, it 
goes on between persons and takes place in an already existing “web of human 
relationships.” “The surrounding presence of others” is the sine qua non of 
action; as such it is nothing else than its defining feature.(11)
Most important in her notion of people’s concerted action is her idea that 
their “acting together” creates and preserves the polis or public space. In Arendt’s 
understanding the significant meaning of the ancient Greek polis should not be 
understood statically, as an ordinary institutional or topographical image.(12) It 
is, instead, like the biblical idea of the ekklêsia (church), to be understood in 
the dynamic terms of a community’s living collective existence itself. In other 
words, it must be grasped as an interpersonal and phenomenological notion. 
Arendt described the interpersonal and phenomenological feature of the polis by 
invoking the famous saying of the ancient Greece, “Wherever you go, you will 
be a polis”:
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The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; 
it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking 
together, and its true space lies between people living together for this 
purpose, no matter where they happen to be.(13)
Arendt applied the ancient Greeks’ phenomenological self-understanding 
of the polis to her own notion of the public realm. The public realm as such is 
neither necessarily nor automatically the public space for citizens’ appearance. 
Instead the public realm becomes the public space of appearance, or rather 
the public space of appearance opens up within the public realm hic et nunc, 
as it were, only when and where citizens act together by sharing words and 
deeds. If and only if this happens, the public realm as such becomes the locus 
of power and common action where freedom appears and the who of the actors 
is revealed.(14) Understood in this way, the Arendtian phenomenological and 
somewhat existentialist understanding of the public space of appearance suggests 
that it can encompass such diverse forms of “acting together” as the “new social 
movements,” the anti-nuclear demonstrations, the citizens’ organizations joined 
together for the public debate about the ecological future of the globe, and other 
similar groups. 
Behind Arendt’s notion of the public space of appearance and freedom one 
can rightly perceive her phenomenological idea of the world. As it was suggested 
by a number of commentators, this idea was influenced by Heidegger’s 
understanding of Dasein’s “In-der-Welt-sein.” More importantly, it was also 
influenced by Augustine’s understanding of the world (saeculum or mundus). In 
point of fact, these two thinkers’ impact on her idea of the world is traceable in 
the earliest stage of her scholarly career: her dissertation, Der Liebesbegriff bei 
Augustin (1929). 
If I am to confine myself merely to Augustine's influence here, Arendt is 
Augustinian through and through in her understanding of the world. It can be 
seen, especially when she evokes Augustine to maintain that not the inhabitants 
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of the world but those who love and care for the world alone can turn the 
world as God's creation into a genuinely human world of their own, which is 
to say, their own home, and that at the same time they themselves become the 
true citizens of the world by so doing.(15) It follows that just as the family is 
not merely biologically constituted but more significantly the family becomes 
a true family by its members’ mutual love and care, so citizens’ amor mundi 
alone is what is capable of constituting the world and of making it a true world 
of their own. I would like to call attention to the generally overlooked fact that 
Augustine, often referred to as “my old friend” (16) by Arendt, remains a decisive 
influence on the formation of her thought. For one can easily discern the imprint 
of both Augustine’s thought itself and his mode of thinking in such constitutive 
concepts as the world, world alienation, love, amor mundi, citizenship, natality, 
mortality, power, willing, freedom, and memory. These concepts are either what 
she rather directly came to acquire and make her own out of her examination of 
Augustine's thought or the result of having reformulated his ideas by means of 
her confrontation or dialogue with them.
To be sure, Arendt shares the common ground with Habermas’s 
communicative theory. This can be seen especially in identifying the creative and 
critical realm of people’s interaction in the public sphere. Both thinkers assume 
that the public sphere in its undistorted form signals the space of freedom 
and equality where prevails neither the pattern of domination nor the one of 
systematization as often seen in the state or in the market. Moreover, Arendt 
shares with Habermas the pessimistic understanding of the politics of our age. 
Both thinkers recognize the deepening crisis of the disintegration of the public 
sphere in the late-modern development of the “mass society.” Despite these 
points of concurrence, however, certain major differences between Arendt and 
Habermas figure prominently with regard to the assessment of the public sphere. 
First, whereas Habermasian communicative theory--or ethics in more 
recent years--is aimed at consensus per se reached through discursive processes 
in the public sphere, Arendt is concerned not so much with the public space as 
the realm where consensus is to be reached as with the realm where people will 
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cooperate with one another in dealing with whatever is common and public, and 
where freedom as well as something new and virtuosic will appear.(17) Second, a 
great difference consists in their views with regard to the relationship between 
the public sphere and civil society. On the one hand, Habermas's more or less 
sociological and institutional approach, especially in his early work on the 
structural transformation of the public sphere, assumes that the public sphere 
is rooted in, and emerges from, what has been traditionally called civil society. 
On the other hand, Arendt's approach refuses to conceive the public space in 
sociological or institutional terms. She also draws a sharp line of demarcation 
between it and whatever is social. As we shall see, Arendt tends to understand 
the social as the systematizing and totalizing forces which usurp the creative 
potentials of the public sphere and the freedom of politics as well.(18)
Third, the two thinkers differ in their assessments of difference and 
struggle. This divergence is important for our concern here. On the one hand, the 
Habermasian theory of the public sphere generally emphasizes the establishment 
of unity and consensus as the telos of communicative rationality. It cannot 
easily swallow difference and struggle as such.(19) On the other hand, Arendt is 
concerned less about winning consensus or agreement than about doing justice 
to, and invigorating, the human condition of plurality. She insists that human 
plurality which “has the twofold character of distinction and equality” is the 
basic condition for freedom, as much as it remains the law of the world and of 
the self.(20)
 This observation in turn leads directly to Arendt's second notion of action, 
agonistic performance. The second notion of action itself accounts for her 
persistent concern to underscore a creative element in agôn, struggle, diversity, 
and difference. This notion of agonistic and heroic action was again derived 
from her interpretative reconstitution of the Greek experiences of the warrior’s 
politics as seen through Homeric and Periclean notions of action. This agonal 
spirit was, according to Arendt, manifest in Achilles who was depicted by Homer 
as “the doer of great deeds and the speaker of great words.” (21) The epic actor of 
agonistic performance was inspirited by the urge toward his own excellency in 
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extraordinary deeds and words so as to win “immortal fame.” As such it became 
“the prototype of action for Greek antiquity.” (22)  Needless to say, however, it is 
important to be reminded that this agonistic action tended to be anarchic, anti-
democratic, and even destructive of the public realm itself.(23)
A bewildering aspect of her sudden introduction of this agonistic 
performance in The Human Condition is that Arendt fails to account for the 
reason why this “highly individualistic”(24) type of action, aiming competitively 
at distinction, glory and self-disclosure that is obtained often at the expense of 
other people, can be qualified as belonging to the category of action that is, by 
definition, based on plurality. To be sure, a political community is postulated 
by Arendt in order to remember, to tell a story about, and to pass to later 
generations, the great deeds and words of the political actors, lest the memory 
of their heroic virtù should be forgotten.(25) But there seems to be no solid 
explanation provided, on Arendt’s part, for the ground on which agôn is tied up 
to “acting in concert.” Perhaps the only possible exception is her etymological 
delineation of action, i.e., the Greek word archein and the Latin agere. Arendt 
points toward the original meaning of archein or agere, which is, “to take 
an initiative,” “to begin something new,” “to lead,” or “to set something in 
motion.” (26)
There is no doubt that as some of the recent commentators especially from 
the theoretical--not always but mostly postmodern--perspectives of difference 
and creative contest have made it clear,(27) Arendt is indeed so fascinated with 
agonistic performance that her notion of action can be described as implying 
both a celebration of agonistic contestation and an almost dramaturgic 
significance of action itself. For instance, Bonnie Honig, in her stimulating work 
entitled Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (1993), has submitted 
to a thoroughgoing criticism various types of what she calls “virtue theories of 
politics” whether republican, liberal, or communitarian. According to Honig, 
these various forms of political theorizing have resulted in what she refers 
to as “the displacement of politics in political theory,” due to their essential 
hostility to the disruptive and contentious elements of politics. Honig appeals to 
14 15
Hannah Arendt, the Nation State, and Federalism
Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and Arendt in particular, for a theoretical alternative, i.e., 
an agonistic, virtuosic, and invigorating vision of politics.(28)
Despite the fact that we need to be constantly aware of their individualist 
and possibly anti-democratic tendency, there is little doubt that Honig and 
others have recovered as a necessary corrective an agonistic aspect of Arendt’s 
notion of action which is often overlooked by the theorists of the public sphere 
and deliberative democracy. After all, Arendt is a political theorist with an epic 
disposition who has ascribed to action “the shining brightness we once called 
glory” and “the criterion of greatness” in the manner of a Homeric and even 
Hesiodic poet.(29)
As already mentioned, Arendt’s notion of action together with speech 
assumes its existentialist and phenomenological character in its revelatory or 
self-disclosing function. What action necessarily reveals is not the what of the 
actor, that is, his talents, qualities or attributes but the who of the actor, that is, 
his own persona, his qua-person character, his unique and distinct identity or 
personal traits.(30) For Arendt this is why action reveals freedom, and why the 
public space is the space of freedom.(31) As we shall see later, the interdependent 
relationship between action and freedom in Arendt’s thought resides in the 
former’s personal and self-disclosing capacity. Action is free, whenever it 
reveals something personal of the agent--that is, his Selbständigkeit. Thus, one 
may rightly say that the specific character of freedom consists in an uncoerced 
and spontaneous self-disclosing of the agent’s identity. Again, action is free, 
whenever it is guided by a value, an intention or a motivation which is personal 
or whenever it arises out of the agent’s willing consent. In contrast, action is not 
free, whenever it is dictated by what is not intrinsic of the agent, that is, some 
objective force outside of his willing, whether it be someone else’s will or the 
domineering power of the state, the force of capital, or the mechanism of the 
market. For Arendt such action cannot be legitimately regarded as an expression 
of freedom. 
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III. Arendt’s Politics of Freedom and Citizenship
When we analyze and examine Arendt’s ideas of politics within the broader 
framework of her major works, it becomes apparent that for her a politics of 
freedom basically consists of two fundamental modes of politics. One can be 
characterized as a politics of world-constructing and the other as a politics of 
resistance. Her two notions of action which we have already examined, i.e., 
people’s concerted action and their agonistic performance, serve as the basic 
stuff and ingredients which make up each of the dual aspects of politics. My 
understanding is that the Arendtian politics of freedom can become a source of 
great illumination for citizens both within and beyond the territorial boundary of 
the nation state in the light of their current quest for a theoretical formulation of 
citizens’ democratic politics of freedom. 
First, Arendt’s fervor for a politics of constructing the common and public 
world from below can be traced in various forms in every single book she has 
written for political theory. The most conspicuous form of Arendt’s politics 
of world-constructing is beyond doubt a politics of founding, as developed 
particularly in The Human Condition (1958), On Revolution (1963), and 
Between Past and Future (enlarged ed., 1968). She was especially interested in 
the modern founding of the American Republic as well as the ancient foundation 
of the Roman Republic. These political foundings are not only the political 
acts of constituting the body politic but also the outcomes of people’s free 
action in terms of beginning something new and permanent.(32) In the cases of 
ancient Rome and of modern America the political founding not only became 
the authoritative beginning but also came to guarantee the stability of the body 
politic for succeeding generations. Arendt pays close attention to the framing 
of a constitution in the modern age, since this act is understood as identical 
with the act of political founding under modern conditions.(33) Her well-known 
preference for the founding of the American Republic over and against the 
French Revolution is backed up by her argument that the American case more 
closely than the French case resembled what the Medieval legist Bracton called 
constitutio libertatis.(34)
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Arendt’s preoccupation with political founding is significant for our 
concern. For it belongs to both categories of action that we have already seen: 
agonistic action and cooperation. Without the agonal, virtuosic and revolutionary 
action of the founders, there can be no possibility for bringing about something 
new, i.e., a new body politic of freedom, and no way to set up the institutional 
framework for new political regime. Likewise, without the people’s concerted 
effort to create, care for, and maintain the body politic and its institutional 
framework, no political founding can succeed or endure. 
Arendt’s notion of action as cooperation, her vision of common power from 
below as arising out of people’s concerted effort to “act together,” her idea of 
amor mundi, and her political notions of forgiveness and keeping promises, all 
seem to fit well with a politics of constructing the common world. The driving 
motor of the politics of world-constructing is nothing less than what she calls “the 
world-building capacity” of men and women, as it is displayed whenever they 
“act in concert” and thus keep power in existence by “binding and promising, 
and combining and covenanting.” (35)
Second, Arendt’s vision of politics also comprises another mode of the 
politics of freedom, and I would like to call it a politics of resistance. To be 
sure, the resistance aspect of Arendtian politics of freedom might look less 
clear-cut and less developed than its counterpart, a world-constructing politics. 
Nonetheless, Arendt’s commitment to the philosopher’s existence in solitude, 
to the pariah’s dialectical attitude toward the surrounding world, to the political 
significance of civil disobedience, and even to the notion of amor mundi itself, 
all seem to point toward a politics of resistance. As a matter of fact, her vision of 
authentic politics itself signifies an aversion not only to the systematizing forces 
of the market, of capital, and of labor; but it also expresses an aversion to any 
politics of systematization, whether it be a bureaucratic politics of control or a 
hegemonic politics of rulership.(36) Her ideal forms of politics are often those of 
either local and small-scale politics or revolutionary resistance. They include, for 
instance, the ancient Greek polis, the Roman res publica, the colonial American 
township, the American Revolution, the council system during the French 
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Revolution, the soviets on the eve of the Russian Revolution, the Hungarian 
Revolution, and the civil rights movement in the United States. 
Thus, Arendt’s vision of politics is unmistakably one of resistance, which 
always makes a stand against any systematizing or automatizing force, whether 
social, scientific-technological or ideological, when they come to usurp the 
public space of action and freedom. There exists a certain resemblance between 
Arendt’s politics of resistance and the poststructuralist--and particularly 
Foucauldian—“resistance” as a local struggle against the centralizing hegemony 
of the knowledge/power compound.(37) It is also true that the core of her agonistic 
action is manifest in this very politics of resistance. The arena of politics is here 
again the very locale for beginning something new where significant alterations 
or transformations will take place first in the world.(38)
The general context informing this politics of resistance is Arendt’s 
multitudinous protest against what Hans Erler has once characterized as “the 
totalizing process-character of modernity.” (39) Moreover, her politics of resistance 
signifies a politics of preservation, that is, an attempt to preserve the common 
world of human plurality and the possibility of action and freedom in the face of 
the systematizing, automatizing and totalizing forces of the modern world.(40) She 
has identified a variety of alienating forces threatening the possibility of politics. 
The list of those forces is appalling both in their multiplicity and because of their 
sharing the common feature of modernity. They comprise the ideological and 
self-authenticating “laws of Nature or of History” in totalitarianism, the levelling 
and conforming demands of the social, the instrumentalism and utilitarianism of 
the mass and consumer society, the life-bound automatizing--at the same time 
endless and worldless--processes and mentality of labor, or the “universalization” 
of the techno-scientific knowledge/power.(41) Thus, the theme of resistance to 
the systematizing and world-alienating forces of the modern world should be 
understood as the most comprehensive framework in which Arendt’s politics 
of resistance is set. But Arendt’s politics of resistance has been elaborated 
and treated more concretely at least in the following three specific areas: civil 
disobedience, the pariah’s attitude toward the world, and the solitary philosopher 
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in his borderline existence. According to Arendt, while these forms of resistance 
attempt to challenge the evil and falsity of politics, they might, by so doing, save 
and preserve rather than destroy the possibility of politics without violating the 
rules of the realm of politics. Therefore, despite their anti-political or unpolitical 
outlook, they can remain to her distinctively political forms of resistance.
Thus, the content of Arendt’s politics of freedom is far from empty or 
insubstantial. This Arendtian vision of the politics of freedom, expressed 
concretely in terms of a politics of constructing the common world as well as 
a politics of resistance, seems to have rich potentials to be further employed 
and elaborated for the best advantage of the democratic politics of both the 
citizens within the nation state and the citizens of the world.(42) Just as the Sitz im 
Leben for her notion of power is to be located not in the ordinary realm of the 
sovereign state but in the realm of citizens’ participation, so the very locus where 
the Arendtian politics of freedom is to be practiced and pursued is the field of the 
citizens’ democratic participation in politics both within and without the nation 
state. To be sure, such ideas as “world citizenship” and “democracy beyond the 
territorial boundary of the nation state” still have a certain utopian ring around 
them. For these ideas have not yet established sufficiently their institutional 
and legal underpinnings. As William Connolly indicated, however, the idea of 
“territorial democracy” as well as the idea of citizenship confined within the 
territorial boundary of the state clearly have the air of unreality and utopianism 
all the more in the world today.(43) This view is compelling especially in the light 
of the present situation where the world is visited by globally related issues such 
as ecological disaster, the exhaustion of natural resources, the threat of nuclear 
weapons, the north-south dichotomy, the amalgamation or centralization of 
power and resources in international political economy, and ethnic and racial 
conflicts. It seems obvious then that besides the nation states and international 
organizations, the world citizens together with many reliable forms of non-
governmental organizations, are called out as actors of worldwide-grassroots 
politics to participate in the public matters pertaining to the world as a whole. 
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IV. The Sovereign State, Human Rights, and Civil Rights
Arendt’s basic doubt about the sovereign state and its citizenship does 
not lead to the advocacy for the abolition of the modern sovereign state. Nor 
it leads to the endorsement of the liberal idea of world citizenship which 
enjoyed popularity with certain segments of intellectuals before, during, and 
after World War II. World War I had a significant impact on Arendt’s thinking, 
the indelible trace of which is found, for instance, in a chapter entitled “The 
Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism. In this chapter she argues that the occurrence of World 
War I signaled the collapse of European civilization.(44) It is important to note 
that Arendt’s own “stateless” predicament during World War II enabled her to 
perceive that the greatest and far-reaching consequence of World War I was its 
creation of massive “stateless,” “homeless” and “rightless” people in the midst 
of European Continent.(45) In Arendt’s mind an essential characteristic of the 
twentieth-century refugees resides in the intimate interconnectedness in which 
their “statelessness,” “homelessness,” and “rightlessness” are set with one 
another. In reference to refugees, she states:
Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had 
left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their 
human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth. (46)
Particularly in the post-World War I context where took place the massive 
flow of the minorities and the stateless people of Eastern and Southern Europe 
into Central and Western Europe, according to Arendt, “hatred” began to play 
a central role in public affairs everywhere in Europe and “denationalization” 
became a new powerful weapon of totalitarian politics.(47) The disintegration of 
Europe shattered the façade of Europe’s political system. It laid bare its hidden 
frame; European nation-states were unable to guarantee human rights to those 
who had lost nationally guaranteed rights.(48) She states as follows: 
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The very phrase “human rights” became for all concerned--victims, 
persecutors, and onlookers alike--the evidence of hopeless idealism or 
fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy.(49)
As Arendt argues, the relationship between “human rights”--or natural 
rights--and nationally guaranteed “civil rights” is far from straightforward 
but replete with a series of “poignant” ironies not only by fact but also in 
principle.(50) The most piercing irony consists in the fact that the experience of 
refugees in the twentieth century has shown that there can be no human rights 
without civil or nationally guaranteed rights, despite the fact that human rights 
have been conceived as “fundamental,” “natural,” and “inalienable” since 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789.(51) This painful fact has been 
commonly recognized and experienced by millions of stateless and homeless 
people in the twentieth century which has been correctly labeled as “the century 
of the refugee.” (52) Stateless persons suddenly discovered their plight in which 
they not only lost their home, i.e., a distinct place in the world, but also they 
lost government protection for their fundamental human rights. Human rights, 
whether life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, according to the American formula, or 
equality before the law, liberty, protection of property, and national sovereignty, 
according to the French, proved to be “unenforceable” even in countries whose 
Constitutions were based upon them.(53) Needless to say, the loss of human rights 
for Arendt were detrimental both to human beings’ “humanity” and to their 
“political capacity.” The loss of human rights primarily meant “the loss of the 
relevance of the speech” and “the loss of all human relationship,” that is, the 
essential prerequisites for humanity and politics.(54)  
To begin with, human rights were commonly held to be independent of any 
nationality, government, citizenship and the state. Human rights were supposed 
to be, once and for all, bestowed inalienably and universally upon every person. 
The fact remains, however, that human rights presuppose national citizenship. 
Indeed, human rights are guaranteed in terms of civil rights by the Constitution 
of the sovereign state, so that the loss of national or civil rights may entail the 
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loss of human rights.(55) Arendt’s view regarding the discrepancy between human 
rights and civil rights is basically twofold. First, she maintains over and against 
the theorists who claim the priority of “natural” or “human rights” over “civil 
rights” that the former not only in principle but also in fact depend on the latter. 
Consequently a political artifice is needed for the protection of human rights.(56) 
Arendt states as follows:
.... the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall 
back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and 
no institution was willing to guarantee them.(57)
As Robert Legros has persuasively argued, human rights in the thought of 
Arendt presuppose not the apriori idea of human beings’ innate and inalienable 
rights but rather their life in human plurality and the common world deeply 
rooted in the historicity of people.(58) 
Arendt’s second point is closely related to the first. She shows that the 
declaration of inalienable human rights out from the start produced “an ‘abstract’ 
human being who seemed to exist nowhere.” (59) Both the American Declaration 
of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man used 
language like “inalienable,” “given with birth,” and “self-evident truth,” which 
undoubtedly stem from an “abstract” idea of human beings. In this connection, 
Arendt highlighted Edmund Burke’s criticism of the “natural rights” language 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man in the French Revolution. According 
to Burke, the “rights of man” claimed in the French Revolution were an 
“abstraction.” For Burke, it was much wiser to rely on an “entailed inheritance” 
of rights which has been historically transmitted. Thus, Burke insisted that 
“human rights” should be claimed as the “rights of an English man” rather 
than as human being’s “inalienable rights.” (60) Arendt approvingly appealed to 
Burke’s claim:
According to Burke, the rights we enjoy spring “from within the nation,” so 
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that neither natural law, nor divine command, nor any concept of mankind 
such as Robespierre’s “human race,” “the sovereign of the earth,” are 
needed as a source of law.(61)
Arendt’s support of Burke’s argument that the abstract nakedness of being 
nothing but human was human beings’ greatest danger betrays again her 
following conviction which lies at the center of her political theory: “Our 
political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through 
organization, because man can act in and change and build a common world, 
together with his equals and only with his equals.” (62)
V. Toward a World Confederation and Dual Citizenship
There seems to be little question in my view that some substantial factors 
which make up Arendt’s political theory of freedom suggest the way beyond 
the modern paradigm of the sovereign nation-state. For example, her lifelong 
quest for the public vinculum points to the establishment of the artificial--not 
naturalistic--mode of political identity among the citizens as diverse equals.(63) Her 
vision of the artificial public vinculum of the citizens is an expression of political 
and discursive “constructionism” of citizens; as such it is essentially incongruous 
with a naturalistic or quasi-naturalistic mode of political corporation inherent 
to the modern nation-state and its “primordialism” expressed in the modern 
nationalist ideology.(64)  
Furthermore, her animosity toward the notion of sovereignty as the basis 
for the consolidation of rulership, whether state sovereignty or the sovereignty 
of people, unmistakably expresses the core of her vision of a citizens’ politics 
informed by human freedom and plurality. In an unpublished manuscript 
entitled “Nationalstaat und Demokratie” (1965), she argues that the concept 
of sovereignty stemming anyway from absolutism is becoming “a dangerous 
illusion” in the contemporary international relation of powers. Arendt also 
argues that only in a decentralized “federation” alone a “real” democracy in 
world politics can become effective.(65) It may be correct to say that Arendt’s 
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political reflection incorporates the same “weltbürgerliche Absicht” as she 
herself discovered in Immanuel Kant and Karl Jaspers.(66)
Indeed, Arendt’s search for a decentralized “federation” for the future 
generations is a relevant contribution in view of the current plight of various 
types of refugees. Furthermore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that 
“federalism” broadly defined (67) is postulated theoretically by the post-Cold War 
politics of the world. Theoretically speaking, the notion of “federalism” alone 
can do justice to the aspirations of our age as suggested by the two gigantic 
waves of the late-modern age, democracy and nationalism. Today’s world finds 
itself threatened to be engulfed by these two waves, as they often--but not 
always--battle against each other. As represented by the People’s Revolution of 
February 1986 in the Philippines and by a series of the Citizens’ Revolutions of 
1989 in the countries of Eastern Europe, the world is visited with what Samuel 
P. Huntington called the “third wave of democracy.” (68) Surprising to Marxists 
and liberals alike, as equally strong as the demand for democracy today is 
nationalism especially in the form of the reclaiming of ethnic identity and self-
determination on the part of manifold minority groups in various parts of the 
world.
A common denominator governing the recent waves of democracy and 
nationalism is the political awakening of ordinary people and citizens. This 
is apparent in assertions based on self-determination and human rights. To be 
sure, many ethnic and racial conflicts today manifest the explosion of violence 
and inhumanity, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But we cannot deny 
the presence of democratic moments in some of the manifestations of recent 
national or ethnic identity and “multiculturalism.” In view of the strong 
influence of these double waves of democracy and nationalism, federalism 
is theoretically postulated today, insofar as it remains true to its own original 
definition: a combined system of self-rule and shared rule (69) or a system of 
self-identity and interrelatedness to the world outside. In my view nationalism 
without being backed up by federalism cannot obtain its solid and constructive 
bridge to the world outside or whatever is heterogeneous to itself. Democracy as 
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well can neither fulfil its own principle nor ground itself solidly and enduringly 
in the historical situation it is confronted with, unless it is closely tied up with 
federalism. Therefore, federalism is the key that will unlock the dilemmas or 
problems that often plague both nationalism and democracy today.(70)
But when we turn to Arendt’s own ideas regarding the possibility of 
overcoming the sovereign state paradigm, it is not a simple story. For, as we 
have just seen in the above section, Arendt’s astute analyses of the depoliticized 
calamity of stateless persons in the post-World War I Europe indicate that a state 
apparatus even in the form of the sovereign state is vital for the protection of 
human rights. Therefore, Arendt endorses neither the liberal notion of the world 
government nor the idealistic notion of world citizenship.(71) What she found 
“nonsense” is the monolithic or universalist type of world citizenship which 
altogether disregards the historical and national diversities of peoples as well 
as the cultural, racial and ethnic identity of a person. Obviously she fears that 
where no solid institutional and legal apparatuses are organized to ground and 
nurture them, such liberal-idealistic notions as world government and world 
citizenship can easily turn into the dreaded Leviathan world state. 
The centralist and monolithic world government was for Arendt a 
nightmarish prospect for the future world where authentic politics is surely to 
be wiped out. Her position here seems to be congruous, for example, with the 
view suggested by Stephen Toulmin. He also searched for a decentered world 
order by denying the Leviathan world state. Instead Toulmin upheld “Lilliputian 
organizations” such as citizens’ groups, non-governmental organizations, and 
small countries.(72) 
Although Arendt did not propose any clear alternative to both the modern 
paradigm of the sovereign state and to the Leviathan world government, it seems 
apparent that her seminal ideas would point to the possibility of a horizontal 
type of a worldwide federal system or, perhaps more accurately, a worldwide 
confederation.(73) Such concepts as a federal system or a confederation in 
our usage signify both citizens’ politics from below and citizens’ solidarity 
forged out of their differences. By such concepts as worldwide federalism and 
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worldwide confederation we basically mean not merely the confederation of the 
states but more emphatically the formation of worldwide democratic political 
networks of citizens. 
Yet we should be reminded of the fact that Arendt was open to--albeit by no 
means optimistic of--the future possibility of the international federal system in 
which “power .... is horizontally directed so that the federal units mutually check 
and control their powers.” (74) She also talked about the future and new form of 
government in terms of people’s “spontaneous organization of council systems” 
whose principle of organization “begins from below, continues upward, and 
finally leads to a parliament.” (75) She affirmatively referred to the possibility of 
a world-wide council state, stating that “a council state of this sort, to which the 
principle of sovereignty would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited to 
federations of the most various kinds.” (76)
What somewhat resembles her position in this respect is Thomas 
Jefferson’s well-known ideas about what he calls “elementary republics” or “little 
republics,” if they are reinterpreted to cover a global network of “elementary 
republics.” (77) In the case of Arendt, the main actors of the global “elementary 
republics” should be the citizens who are willing to participate in many different 
layers of politics by means of various kinds of council organizations. It seems 
natural to conclude then that Hannah Arendt is open, to say the least, to what 
Karl Jaspers used to maintain, that is, a diversified, horizontal and federative 
system in which the politics of world citizenship is to be sought after.(78)
Arendt’s vision of a worldwide federal system is a horizontally organized, 
decentralist and diversified type of a world confederation where various forms 
of local, national and collective identities will receive due regard and respect. 
Any vision of world federalism, if it remains relevant to the world today, 
must do justice to the local, cultural, ethnic, national, regional, and historical 
diversities of the peoples in the world. People are always embodied with 
various and particular “constitutive attachments.” (79) But at the same time the 
consolidation of the political identity of world citizens in the new global age 
will be encouraged and promoted. World confederation clearly means to be 
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above all the political space for coexistence with others. It is also the political 
mode of existing and living together with others. The political principle here is 
solidarity in which the possibility of coexistence with whatever is heterogeneous 
is pursued to its logical limit. 
This new notion of world citizenship is by no means the simple restatement 
of the old abstract, amorphous, and monolithic liberal-idealist idea. Rather, 
it represents the new political identity of the citizens of the world as diverse 
equals, as they are willing to share the responsibility for caring for the earth and 
the world. This new notion of world citizenship does not reject the old local-
-either national or regional--citizenship. It aims at creating and maintaining 
dual citizenship in which every citizen equally belongs both to a local political 
society from which he is derived and to the oikoumene--the “whole inhabited 
world”--whose member he unmistakably is. Local citizenship and world 
citizenship complement one another. Without local citizenship the citizens of 
the world lose sight of concrete, immediate, and day-to-day responsibilities. 
Without world citizenship the citizens of the world cannot fulfil their shared 
task of constituting a common world which is inhabitable and plural, just and 
sustainable.
* This paper was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, which was held on August 
31 through September 3, 1995. Later I somewhat elaborated this original 
paper by reading new materials and rethinking the themes. 
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本論考は、主権的国民国家パラダイムへのハンナ・アーレントのアンビヴァレント
な態度に焦点をあてながら、彼女の政治思想の特質を形づくる特有の政治観、世界規
模の連邦主義への関心などを取り上げたものである。しばしば批判されるように、確
かにアーレントの政治的考察には制度構想において具体性と内実に欠ける点があるこ
とを承認しつつ、しかし連邦主義的構想が断片的ではあるが表明されている事実に注
目した。議論の流れとしては、アーレントの政治思想にみられる参加的なシティズン
シップ論、活動の二つの概念、政治の現象学的理解、アウグスティヌスの思想との親
和性、ハーバーマスとの相違点、自由とシティズンシップの政治論、主権国家と人権
と市民権の問題、分権型の連邦制への関心、多層的シティズンシップ論への志向性な
どが、順次取り上げられている、
人権の保障のための主権的国民国家パラダイムの重要性が前提とされつつも、その
前提を乗り越えて脱主権国家を追求するアーレントの試みは逆説に満ちたものである
が、この逆説にこそ、暴力の跳梁や利益の配分等から峻別される政治の原イメージを
復権しようとする彼女の政治思想の独自の境地と特徴が示されていることを指摘して
いる。
＜　要　約　＞
千葉　眞
アーレント、国民国家、連邦主義
ー主権国家システムを越えて？ー
